References: [1992] 1 WLR 793
Coram: Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Roskill, Lord Ackner, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Browne-Wilkinson
Ratio: The defendant, convicted of causing death by reckless driving contrary asked the House to reconsider its decision in Lawrence on which the trial judge’s jury direction had been based.
Held: Lawrence remained good. (Lord Keith) ‘where the driver acted under some understandable and excusable mistake or where his capacity to appreciate risks was adversely affected by some condition not involving fault on his part. There may also be cases where the driver acted as he did in a sudden dilemma created by the actions of others.’ (Lord Ackner) on ‘regard must be given to any explanation [the defendant] gives as to his state of mind which may displace the inference’, commented ‘I read this as no more than a cautionary instruction to the jury that, while it would be open to them at first sight to find that the accused was driving recklessly from the mere manner of his driving, if it shows a clear disregard for the lives or safety of others without any explanation for this conduct, yet before reaching any firm conclusions they must have regard to any explanation which accounts for his conduct. In short, they must have regard to all the available evidence.’ The observations on recklessness were directed to the context of driving only.
Lord Goff of Chieveley discussed the possibility that the defendant in a reckless driving case was indifferent to the risk created by his driving or has closed his mind to it, in either case failing to give any thought to the possibility of risk: ‘Every driver knows that driving can be dangerous; and if when a man is in fact driving dangerously in the sense described by Lord Diplock, he does not even address his mind to the possibility of risk, then, absent special circumstances (to which I will refer later) it is right that he should, if the risk was obvious, be held to have been driving recklessly, even though he was not in fact aware of the risk. It cannot be right that in such circumstances he should be able to shelter behind his ignorance, or be given preferred treatment as compared with another person who, having recognised and considered the risk, has wrongly decided to disregard it.’
Statutes: Road Traffic Act 1972 1
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:
- Cited – Regina v Lawrence (Stephen) HL ([1981] 2 WLR 524, [1982] AC 510, (1981) 73 Cr App R 1, [1981] 1 All ER 974)
The defendant had ridden a motor-cycle and hit a pedestrian. The court asked whether he had been reckless.
Held: The House understood recklessness as ‘a state of mind stopping short of deliberate intention, and going beyond mere inadvertence’ . .
(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:
- Cited – Regina v G and R HL (House of Lords, [2003] UKHL 50, Bailii, Times 17-Oct-03, Gazette 13-Nov-03, [2003] 3 WLR 1060, [2004] 1 AC 1034, Bailii, (2003) 167 JP 621, (2003) 167 JPN 955, [2004] 1 Cr App R 21, [2003] 4 All ER 765)
The defendants, young boys, had set fire to paper and thrown the lit papers into a wheelie bin, expecting the fire to go out. In fact substantial damage was caused. The House was asked whether a conviction was proper under the section where the . . - Cited – Brown v The Queen (Jamaica) PC (Bailii, [2005] UKPC 18)
A police officer appealed against his conviction for manslaughter after being involved in a road traffic accident. Two were killed. The policemen complained as to the direction given on gross negligence manslaughter.
Held: Adomako could not . .
(This list may be incomplete)
Last Update: 28 March 2017
Ref: 186791
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