The defendant appealed by case stated against his conviction for driving a Segway scooter on a footpath. He denied that it was ‘a mechanically propelled vehicle intended or adapted for use on roads.’
Held: The appeal failed. The district judge had correctly read and applied the authorities. The manufacturer’s statement that the Segway was not intended for use on the roads was not determinitive, and nor was its treatment in foreign jurisdictions. The test is an objective one.
Munby LJ said: ‘the ultimate question for the court in a case such as this, depending upon whether the offence is charged under the first or second limb, is whether, within the meaning of section 72, the defendant (i) was riding and/or (ii) was leading or driving a carriage, not whether he was riding or driving a motor vehicle. As the statutory provisions to which I have referred demonstrate, a motor vehicle is a carriage for this purpose, but it does not follow from this that the carriage must be a motor vehicle. Indeed, as the authorities that I must shortly come to demonstrate, something which is not a motor vehicle can nonetheless be a carriage for this purpose.’
The Segway was a carriage within the meaning of section 72.
References: [2011] EWHC 2032 (Admin)
Links: Bailii
Judges: Munby LJ, Langstaff J
Statutes: Road Traffic Act 1988 185(1), Highway Act 1835 72 78
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:
- Cited – Corkery v Carpenter KBD ([1950] 2 All ER 745, [1951] 1 KB 102)
The defendant was accused of being drunk in charge of a carriage. He was in fact riding a cycle. Section 12 made it an offence to be ‘drunk while in charge on any highway . . of any carriage, horse, cattle, or steam engine’.
Held: The Act was . . - Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v King Admn (Bailii, [2008] EWHC 447 (Admin))
The defendant was charged after driving a ‘City Mantis Electric Scooter’. He was disqualified from driving. The prosecutor appealed against dismissal of the charges on the basis that the scooter was not of such a description as to require a licence . . - Cited – Daley v Hargreaves ([1961] 1 WLR 487)
The court considered what it was for a vehicle to be intended or adapted for use as a motor vehicle.
Held: The phrase did not refer to the intention as such of any particular purpose. Salmon J suggested that the word ‘intended’ might be . . - Cited – Burns v Currell ([1963] 2 All ER 297, [1963] 2 QB 433)
The defendant was accused of offences related to the driving on a public road a mechanically propelled vehicle, a Go-Kart.
Held: In fact it was not a motor vehicle within the statutory definition. The Court set out the test to be applied in . . - Cited – Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming QBD ([1987] 1 All ER 318, [1987] RTR 378)
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle ‘adapted or intended for use on . . - Cited – Selby (Justin) v Director of Public Prosecutions QBD ([1994] RTR 157)
The defendant sat on a motor bike, propelling it on a pavement with his feet; although the engine was running the machine, according to the defendant, was not in gear.
Held: The justices were correct to have found that the defendant, even on . . - Cited – Director of Public Prosecutions v Saddington; Chief Constable of the North Yorkshire Police v Michael Saddington Admn (Times 01-Nov-00, Bailii, [2000] EWHC Admin 409, [2001] RTR 227)
A motorised scooter of the type known as a ‘Go-Ped’ was a motor vehicle within the Act. Accordingly a driving licence and third party insurance were both required for its use on a public highway. The scooter required the passenger to stand on a . . - Cited – Regina v Mathias ([1861] EngR 97, Commonlii, (1861) 2 F and F 570, (1861) 175 ER 1191)
The court was aked whether the use of a child’s perambulator on a footpath amounted to a public nuisance or, if it did not, something that the owner of the soil was nonetheless entitled to prevent. The defendant argued as to section 72: ‘If a . . - Cited – Taylor v Goodwin QBD ((1879) 4 QBD 228)
The court was asked whether a bicycle was a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of section 78. It was said to have been ‘ridden at a furious pace’. The appellant argued that: ‘A bicycle is not a ‘carriage’ within the meaning of the Act, nor can it be said . . - Cited – Williams v Ellis ((1880) 5 QBD 175, [1880] 49 LJMC 47, [1880] 42 LT 249)
The court was asked whether a bicycle was a carriage for toll purposes.
Held: It was not. The applicable local turnpike Act defined a carriage in such a way that motorised and animal drawn vehices were caught but not otherwise. . . - Cited – Kadhim v Housing Benefit Board, London Borough of Brent CA (Times 27-Mar-01, Bailii, [2000] EWCA Civ 344, [2001] 2 WLR 1674, [2001] QB 955)
A lower court was not bound to follow a decision of a higher court, where the decision at issue had been based, on the relevant point, on an unargued assumption about the law, which had in turn been pivotal to the decision of that higher court: ‘The . . - Cited – Regina v Burstow, Regina v Ireland HL (Bailii, [1997] UKHL 34, [1998] 1 Cr App Rep 177, [1998] AC 147, [1997] 4 All ER 225, [1997] 3 WLR 534)
The defendant was accused of assault occasioning actual bodily harm when he had made silent phone calls which were taken as threatening.
Held: An assault might consist of the making of a silent telephone call in circumstances where it causes . . - Cited – Flower Freight Co Ltd v Hammond ([1963] 1 QB 275)
. . - Cited – Taylor v Mead QBD ([1961] 1 WLR 435)
The defendant, a commercial traveller, fitted a rail across in the back of his private motor car to carry dresses. The issue was whether or not there had been some degree of adaptation.
Held: Lord Parker CJ said: ‘It seems to me that, by . . - Cited – Cannan v Earl of Abingdon ([1900] 2 QB 66)
The court was asked whether it was correct to charge a bicycle as a ‘carriage’ at a toll station for the bridge over the River Thames at Swinford.
Held: On the language of the particular statute a bicycle or tricycle was a ‘carriage’. - Cited – Simpson v Teignmouth and Shaldon Bridge Company CA ([1903] 1 KB 405, [1903] 72 LJKB 204, [1903] 88 LT 117, [1903] 67 JP 65, [1903] 51 WR 545, [1903] 19 TLR 225, [1903] 47 Sol Jo 278, [1903] 1 LGR 235)
The owners of the tolled bridge over the Teign, sought to charge bicycle riders tolls.
Held: A bicycle was not chargeable as a carriage on the bridge toll under the Act establishing it. The court doubted that a bicycle was a ‘carriage hung on . . - Cited – Smith v Kynnersley ([1903] 1 KB 788)
The court held that a bicycle seeking to use a toll road was, by virtue of the words of the statute allowing the charge, not chargeable as a carriage. . . - Cited – Environment Agency v Stanford Admn (Gazette 16-Jun-99, Bailii, [1998] EWHC Admin 690, [1999] ENV LR 286, [1998] COD 373)
The prosecutor appealed against the decision of magistrates to stay a prosecution as an abuse.
Held: The decision of a prosecutor to prosecute remains his alone. Where no clear representations had been made that if certain works were carried . .
(This list may be incomplete)
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